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We study federal economies in which regional governments have responsibility for deliver-
ing public services and redistributive objectives apply. The implications of these for the
assignment of revenue-raising instruments and ﬁscal transfers, both vertical and horizon-
tal, are considered. Models of heterogenous regions of varying degrees of complexity and
generality are constructed. For each case, we determine what ﬁscal instruments must be
given to the regions and what inter-governmental transfers must be made in order that the
social optimum is achieved. With heterogenous households and regions, the social optimum
can be decentralized by making regions responsible for redistribution and implementing
equalization transfers that depend on the number of households of each type.
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Decentralization is a fact of life in most economies. Several important public services, such
as education, health care and social services, are provided by sub-national or ‘regional’
governments with more or less ﬁscal autonomy. These decentralized services are ﬁnanced
by varying combinations of own tax revenues and transfers from the ‘central’ government,
implying a vertical ﬁscal imbalance. The taxes range from surtaxes on central taxes to
separate regional taxes on payrolls, consumption or income. Transfer systems typically
include some equalizing component intended to compensate for the diﬀerences in ﬁscal
capacities that inevitably arise from decentralization. This paper investigates the appro-
priate assignment of taxes to regional governments and the accompanying set of transfers
in standard ﬁscal federalism models.
The existing literature identiﬁes ineﬃciencies and inequities caused by decentralization
that can be countered by appropriate ﬁscal arrangements. On the one hand, various forms
of ﬁscal externalities arise from the fact that one jurisdiction’s policies will aﬀect govern-
ments or households in other jurisdictions. These interactions can occur horizontally, as
when regional governments compete for mobile tax bases, or vertically, as when a region’s
tax changes aﬀect the central government’s budget (Dahlby, 1996). When households dif-
fer in incomes, these externalities can result in non-optimal redistribution policies. On the
other hand, ﬁscal decentralization, by creating diﬀerences in the capacity of the regions
to provide public services, results in so-called ﬁscal ineﬃciency and ﬁscal inequity. The
former occurs when the diﬀerences in ﬁscal capacity give rise to purely ﬁscal incentives to
migrate from one region to the next, quite apart from productivity diﬀerences. The latter
occurs between non-migrants of diﬀerent regions: otherwise identical persons are treated
diﬀerently by the public sector, so horizontal equity is violated.1 These ﬁscal ineﬃciencies
and inequities provide the rationale for equalization. While there is a relatively large litera-
ture on ﬁscal externalities, the literature on the theory of equalization is relatively limited,
and tends to be conﬁned mainly to models of homogeneous households with symmetric
outcomes, with some exceptions (e.g. Burbidge and Myers 1994, Boadway, Marchand and
Vigneault 1998). Two aspects of decentralization that are relevant in practice are thereby
1 The notions of ﬁscal ineﬃciency and ﬁscal inequity are due to Buchanan (1950, 1952). A
general treatment of the circumstances in which they arise, and the forms of equalization
that can deal with them is found in Boadway and Flatters (1982b).
1neglected — redistribution at sub-national levels of government and equalization.
In our analysis, we assume there is some public good that by its nature is provided
by regional governments. We focus on the implications of this assumed decentralization
of expenditure responsibilities for the assignment of revenue-raising instruments and ﬁscal
transfers, both vertical and horizontal. Our methodology involves constructing models of
heterogenous regions of varying degrees of complication and generality. For each case, we
characterize the planning optimum using the ﬁctitious notion of a unitary state in which
the central government takes all ﬁscal decisions on behalf of itself and the regions. Then,
we consider how the unitary state optimum can be decentralized by a judicious choice of
ﬁscal policy instruments for the regions, taking as given the expenditure responsibilities of
the regional governments.
The appropriate method of decentralization will depend on the structure of the econ-
omy as well as on the assumed strategic interaction among the various actors in the model:
the central government, the regional governments and the private agents. Following much
of the literature on equalization, we focus on so-called Ricardian models in which labour
mobility is the only variable factor of production and the main source of interdependency
in the federation. Likewise, the timing of decision-making or strategic interaction is such
that the central government moves ﬁrst, followed by regional governments, and then by
private agents. Regional governments act as Nash competitors with respect to each other’s
policies, and private agents are price-takers. Indeed, the location decision is the only real
decision households take since we assume that their labour supplies are ﬁxed. Moreover,
we assume that regional public services have no spillover beneﬁts to residents of other
regions. These assumptions allow us to focus on the sorts of ﬁscal externalities that can
be addressed by equalization transfers, those due to labour mobility.2
Heterogeneity can come from three sources in our models. Regions can be hetero-
geneous because of diﬀerences in production functions, say, because of diﬀerences in the
2 Some sources of ﬁscal externality that have been emphasized in the literature are eﬀectively
assumed away, including capital and commodity tax competition, inter-regional spillovers
and vertical ﬁscal externalities. See Wilson (1999) for a general discussion of tax competi-
tion, especially capital tax competition. Lockwood (2001) synthesizes the various forms of
commodity tax competition. Boadway and Keen (1996) consider the eﬀects of vertical ﬁscal
externalities.
2endowment of ﬁxed factors. Households can be heterogeneous for two reasons: ﬁrst, be-
cause they have diﬀerent costs of migration from one region to the other; and second,
because they have diﬀerent productivities. Throughout, we assume that governments are
benevolent and that central and regional governments agree on the form of the social wel-
fare function that satisﬁes three basic value judgments: i) the Pareto principle, ii) the
symmetric and anonymous treatment of all citizens within the relevant jurisdiction, and
iii) a non-negative aversion to inequality.3 For simplicity, the aversion to inequality is taken
to be zero (i.e. the least redistributive), so that the social welfare function is utilitarian.
We proceed as follows. We begin with the case where all households supply ho-
mogeneous labour. Given the heterogeneity of regions, decentralization will need to be
accompanied by inter-regional redistribution, or equalization. We then brieﬂy consider
some extensions to this analysis in Section 3. First, we examine the consequences of full
decentralization whereby all ﬁscal responsibilities, including inter-regional transfers, are
devolved to the regional level. Second, we consider reversals in the order of decision-
making, perhaps because of an inability of governments to commit to policies. Thus, we
determine the implications of regional governments moving before the central government,
and also of labour migration occuring before at least some policy decision-making. The
homogenous labour case and its extensions generalize and synthesize existing results in the
literature as well as serves as a useful basis for — and contrast to — the case we consider
in Section 4 in which household productivities can diﬀer. In this latter case, there will be
both inter-regional and intra-regional redistribution. As we shall see, the latter possibility
changes the nature of decentralization considerably.
2 Homogeneous Labour
The case of homogeneous labour is the one most commonly treated in the literature on
equalization. Here, we use it as a useful benchmark to analyze the consequences of making
the regions responsible for providing regional public goods and services to their residents.
We indicate the ﬁscal arrangements necessary in a federation to ensure that the optimal
3 There is ample literature on federations in which governments adopt some non-benevolent
decision rule. These range from models based on political decision-making, such as majority
rule (see Persson and Tabellini 2000), to those that reﬂect the power of the bureaucracy (e.g.
Brennan and Buchanan 1990).
3resource allocation is achieved.
There are two regions i =1 ,2, each endowed with an initial population Oi.4 House-
holds may migrate across regions. The number of residents in region i after migration
takes place is Ni, such that O1 + O2 = N1 + N2 = N,w h e r eN is total population. In
what follows, we assume that the population is a continuum to simplify the analysis. Each
household supplies one unit of labour to the region of its residence, so Ni is the labour
supply of region i. Aggregate production functions for the two regions diﬀer from one
another and are given by Fi(Ni), where F 
i > 0 >F   
i . For concreteness, we assume that
F2(N) >F 1(N),F  
2(N) >F  
1(N), so region 2 is the more productive one (perhaps because
it has more of an underlying ﬁxed factor).5
Migration may be costly. Costless migration, commonly assumed in the literature,
is but a special case and yields qualitatively similar results when households are homoge-
neous. Migration costs take a non-pecuniary form which ensures that they have no resource
implications. All households are equally happy in their original region. If they move, they
incur varying degrees of non-pecuniary dissatisfaction: those with the least dissatisfaction
from moving will move ﬁrst.6 Therefore, we can depict the migration cost of the marginal
household by the migration cost function k(Oi − Ni), where Oi − Ni is the total number
of migrants from region i to the other region and k  ≥ 0. Migration will occur in one
direction only, and that direction will depend on the initial allocation of population. For
illustrative purposes, we assume that migration goes from region 1 to region 2, but that
has no bearing on the qualitative results in this section.
Households have identical utility functions of the form u(ci)+b(gi), where ci is con-
sumption of a composite private good in region i that serves as numeraire, and gi rep-
4 Our notation convention is that aggregate variables and aggregate functions will be in upper
case, while individual variables and functions are in lower case. Central government policies
will be denoted using Roman letters, while regional ones will use Greekletters.
5 To be more speciﬁc, we assume that the two regions have the same production function given
by G(Ti,N i)w h e r eTi is the amount of ﬁxed factor in region i, GT,G N > 0, GTT,G NN < 0,
and GNT > 0. Therefore, Fi(N)=G(Ti,N) and assuming T2 >T 1 implies the above.
6 This diﬀers from the attachment-to-home concept used in Mansoorian and Myers (1993),
where persons obtain diﬀering levels of satisfaction in their region of residence. That is, even
non-migrants obtain diﬀerent levels of non-pecuniary satisfaction from being in their original
location.
4resents a public service whose beneﬁts accrue equally to all residents of region i.T h e
latter is related to public expenditures Gi in region i by gi = Gi/N α
i ,w h e r eα is a con-
gestion parameter which can take values 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For α =0 ,g is a pure public
good, while for α = 1, it is a publicly provided private good. Thus, α is also an index
of privateness of the public good. We assume that the marginal rate of transformation
between private and public goods is unity, so production for the nation as a whole is
F1(N1)+F2(N2)=N1c1 + N2c2 + G1 + G2. Note that this assumes that all households
within region i receive the same consumption — migrants and non-migrants alike. If mi-
gration goes from region 1 to 2, migration equilibrium (assuming an interior solution)
satisﬁes: u(c1)+b(g1)=u(c2)+b(g2) − k(O1 − N1). The marginal migrant will bear a
non-pecuniary migration cost of k(O1 − N1), while all O1 − N1 infra-marginal migrants
bear a lower cost.
Unitary State Optimum
As a benchmark, we characterize the planning optimum. To do this, we characterize the
optimum of a ﬁctitious unitary state in which all ﬁscal instruments, including those that are
region speciﬁc, are in the hands of the central government, although for heuristic purposes
we diﬀerentiate between central and regional budgets. This case is ﬁctitious in the sense
that we assume that the central government can provide the regional public services gi as
eﬃciently as could the regions themselves. If this were literally the case, there would be
no need to decentralize the provision of gi to the regions. In fact, in the real world, there
are numerous reasons why the regions may be more eﬃcient at providing the public good
that the central government.
Labour markets are perfectly competitive, so labour income of a resident in region i
is given by the marginal product F  
i(Ni). We assume that all rents go to the government,
either because it owns the ﬁxed factor or because it has access to a rent tax, which it
uses to the fullest.7 Rents in region i are given by: Ri(Ni)=Fi(Ni) − NiF 
i(Ni)w h e r e
7 The issue of who gets the rents in a federation is an important one. On the one hand, if
rents accrue to regional governments, this constitutes a source of diﬀerence in tax capacity
that can cause ineﬃciency, as discussed in Boadway and Flatters (1982a). We assume both
in the budget assignment of the unitary state and in the decentralized outcome below that
the regional governments collect the rents. An alternative is to assume that rents accrue to
households nationwide. See Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974). This introduces
5R 
i(Ni)=−NiF  
i (Ni) > 0.
The unitary state policy instruments include those that might be used in a decentral-
ized setting. Those attributed to the central budget include a per person tax of ti on each
resident in region i and a transfer Ti to region i. Notional regional policies include the
public good and three types of taxes — a surtax of σi imposed on ti, a payroll tax at the
rate πi, and a consumption tax θi.R e n t sRi are assumed to accrue to the region i budget.









N1t1 +( N − N1)t2 − T1 − T2 ≥ 0( λ)
T1 + N1(σ1t1 + π1F 
1(N1)+θ1c1)+R1(N1) − (N1)αg1 ≥ 0( λ1)
T2 +( N − N1)(σ2t2 + π2F
 
2(N − N1)+θ2c2)+R2(N − N1) − (N − N1)
αg2 ≥ 0( λ2)
u(c2)+b(g2) − k(O1 − N1) − u(c1) − b(g1)=0 ( γ)
where ci =( F 
i(Ni)(1 − πi) − (1 + σi)ti)/(1 + θi) ,a n dw eh a v eu s e dt h er e l a t i o n s h i p
Gi = Nα
i gi. The ﬁrst three constraints are the notional budget constraints of the central
government and the two regions, while the last constraint is the migration equilibrium
condition. Notice that the central government is assumed to use N1 as a control variable.
This is purely artiﬁcial, and is the counterpart to adding the migration equilibrium condi-
tion as a constraint in the problem.8 The equation labels (λ)a n d( γ)i np r o b l e m( P) refer
to the Lagrange multipliers associated with the relevant constraints.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions on T1 and T2,w eo b t a i nλ1 = λ2 = λ.T h i s i n
turn implies that the ﬁrst-order conditions on σi, πi and θi are the same as those on ti,
which means that, in this homogeneous labour setting, the tax instruments assigned to the
regions are redundant. Thus, starting from a set of policies {ti,σ i,π i,θ i,T i} that satisﬁes
the possibility of source-based rent taxes, which can be a source of ineﬃciency in regional
decision-making because of tax exporting (Boadway 1982).
8 An alternative procedure would be to use the migration constraint to determine N1 as a
function of policies, and then take the latter as endogenous.
6the ﬁrst-order conditions, any other set that yields the same overall personal tax payment
(1 + σi)ti + πiF 
i + θici in the two regions, accompanied by the appropriate change in
transfers Ti, will also satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions. Accordingly, the optimal vertical
ﬁscal imbalance (VFI) — the total level of transfers to the regions — is indeterminate.
Using the above result and the fact that R 
i(Ni)=−NiF  
i (Ni), we can combine
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The ﬁrst-order condition on N1 may be written as:
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It is important to note that the migration equilibrium constraint is generally binding here,
so γ  = 0, although it is not clear whether γ is positive or negative. This is true even if
migration is costless. Therefore, according to the last relationship, consumption will not
be equalized across the two regions nor will the level of public services. This is in contrast
to the case with heterogeneous households and costless migration discussed below.
Note that in expression (3), αGi/Ni is the increment in cost required to keep the level
of public services constant when an additional migrant enters and imposes congestion on
the others.9 The term (1 + σi)ti − αGi/Ni therefore represents the net beneﬁt to existing
residents from a marginal migrant — the additional revenue raised less the congestion costs
imposed.10 Thus, the left-hand side of (3) is the net ﬁscal externality (NFE) resulting when
a marginal migrant moves from region 1 to region 2. The right-hand side is the additional
9 Using the deﬁnition of Gi = Nα
i gi,w eh a v e∂Gi/∂Ni|gi=constant = αNα−1gi = αGi/Ni.
10 This term is standard. See Buchanan and Goetz (1972), Boadway and Flatters (1982a).
7resource costs arising from the eﬀect of the increased migration costs of the marginal
migrant on the equal utility constraint. An additional migrant increases the marginal
migration costs and increases the diﬀerential between the utility that must be provided in
the two regions. If the NFE is positive then we have c2 >c 1, and the opposite holds when
the NFE is negative.
The optimal grant scheme must simultaneously satisfy the three government budget
constraints (λ1), (λ2)a n d( λ), as well as the optimal allocation of labour equation (3).


















This says that the diﬀerence in per capita transfers to the two regions should compensate
for three sources of diﬀerence in ﬁscal capacities — diﬀerences in per capita expenditure
needs, diﬀerences in per capita tax collections, and diﬀerences in per capita rents. However,
that is a pure accounting interpretation. If we use the optimality condition on N1 given

























= E1 + N1t1 (4)
where E1 is region 1’s equalization entitlement. Similarly, for region 2,
T2 = −E1 + N2t2 = E2 + N2t2
Note that by the central government’s budget constraint, the VFI can be deﬁned as VFI ≡
T1 + T2 = N1t1 + N2t2. The VFI is divided between the two regions according to the
so-called principle of derivation,11 and each region obtains an equalization entitlement Ei,
where E1 + E2 =0 .
The equalization entitlement for, say, region 1 contains three terms reﬂecting the eﬀect
of an additional migrant moving from region 1 to 2. The ﬁrst term is the diﬀerence in
11 This principle says that central tax revenues collected on behalf of regional expenditures
are returned to the regions according to where they are collected. In other words, we could
attribute the tax revenues raised by ti to the regional budgets in the ﬁrst place. In a more
general setting, some central tax revenues would be used for central government expenditures,
w h i c hw eh a v ea s s u m e da w a yh e r e .
8per capita resource costs of providing public goods less the congestion eﬀect. Thus, an
additional migrant contributes the per capita share of the cost of providing public goods,
but reduces the beneﬁts available for existing resident. The second term is the diﬀerence
in per capita rents. Since rents are attributed to regional budgets, persons migrating to
a jurisdiction eﬀectively claims a share of the rents at the expense of existing residents.
The ﬁnal term is the shadow cost of an additional migrant on the migration equilibrium
constraint.
Decentralizing the Unitary State Optimum
In our decentralized setting, regional governments have responsibility for the provision of
public services gi in their own region. The issue is: what ﬁnancing arrangements will
serve to ensure that the unitary state optimum is achieved? It turns out that in this
simple economy with homogeneous labour, there is considerable freedom in the choice of
tax instruments that can be given to the regions and the proportion of own revenues they
can be expected to raise (which determines the VFI).
To be concrete, assume that the regions are able to levy their own per unit tax rates
τi on households in their own region. We could equally have allowed the regions to levy
any of the other taxes introduced above — a surtax σi, a payroll tax πi, or a consumption
tax θi — since in this setting, all are eﬀectively equivalent.12 As well, we assume that the
rents accrue fully to the regional government, although our analysis carries through to the
case where the central government has a share of the rents. It is necessary to be explicit
about the sequence of events in the economy since we have two levels of government as
well as private agents. We take as our standard case the following one:
Stage 1: Central government policies: The central government chooses {ti,T i}, anticipat-
ing regional government policies and private sector outcomes.
Stage 2: Regional government policies: Each regional government chooses {τi,g i} taking
as given central government policies and those of the other regional government,
12 For example, total per person tax liabilities are ti + τi when regions levy their own tax and
(1+σi)ti when regions levy a surtax. There will always be a level of surtax σi that replicates
the overall tax rate achieved under the regional tax. The same will apply for the other taxes.
Note that this will also be the case when the central government levies either a common per
unit tax in both regions or a common proportional tax.
9and anticipating the private sector outcomes.
Stage 3: Migration: Given the policies announced by the two levels of government, house-
holds choose their place of residence.
As mentioned, we assume that both levels of government use as their objective functions
the sum of utilities of ﬁnal residents in their own jurisdictions. The full solution to the
decentralized problem is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), which is obtained
by backward induction. It turns out that we need not fully solve the problem. To verify
the conditions under which the SPNE will replicate the unitary state optimum, it will
suﬃce to consider the Stage 2 problem of the regions.
Consider, for example, the problem of region 1 given that migration goes from region




1(N1) − t1 − τ1)+b(g1)]
subject to
T1 + τ1N1 + R1(N1) − (N1)αg1 ≥ 0( λ1)
u(F  
2(N − N1) − t2 − τ2)+b(g2) − k(O1 − N1) − u(F 
1(N1) − t1 − τ1) − b(g1)=0 ( γ1)
The region’s policy instruments are its own tax rate τ1 and its level of public services g1.I n
addition, it uses as an artiﬁcial variable its population N1, taking account of the migration
equilibrium constraint (γ1). As earlier, this is simply a way of accounting for the fact
that it may recognize that its policies will aﬀect the migration of labour. Precisely how
it expects its policies will aﬀect N1 will depend upon how it assumes the other region’s
policies to be related to its own. It may adopt a Nash conjecture with respect to all
the other region’s policies, or it may be more sophisticated and treat either of τ2 and g2
to be given, with the other determined by budget balance. It turns out to be the case
that whatever Nash conjecture the government of region 1 adopts, the same qualitative
result will apply as long as the central government anticipates its behaviour. In fact, the
decentralization results apply even if the region is myopic and takes N1 as given. To see







10which is the standard public good eﬃciency condition as given by (1). It holds regardless
of how region 1 assumes the other region’s policies are related to its own, and whether it is
myopic. The ﬁrst-order condition on N1 essentially determines the value of γ1 for region 1.
In the myopic case, the region disregards the migration equilibrium constraint, so γ1 =0 .
For region 2, a similar result applies. Assuming its objective is the aggregate utility
of ﬁnal residents, it maximizes:
N2 [u(F 




subject to its regional budget constraint and the migration equilibrium constraint, which
are analogous to (λ1)a n d( γ1). Again, regardless of the conjecture adopted by the region
with respect to the Nash behaviour of region 1, the eﬃciency conditions for the regional
public good applies. Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the same result holds
if regional objective functions are the utilities of original residents, or per capita utility in
the region.13 Indeed, the two regions can even adopt diﬀerent objective functions.
Given that the regions abide by the optimal decision rule for the provision of their
public services, it is apparent that the central government by its choice of taxation and
transfers can ensure that the unitary state outcome is replicated. It simply needs to get
into the hands of the regional governments enough funds to ensure that when the eﬃciency
rule for public goods is satisﬁed, the disposable income of households is suﬃcient to yield
the unitary state optimal value of ci. It is clear that there are alternative ways in which
this may occur. As in the unitary state analysis, the VFI is indeterminate. Any system of
central taxes and transfers to the regions that ensures the optimal allocation of population
(3) and satisﬁes condition (4) and the central budget constraint will suﬃce. Each region
obtains as a transfer the central taxes levied in its jurisdiction as well as an equalization
transfer, which may be positive or negative. There is apparently no restriction on the
taxes levied by the central government. For example, they could be uniform across regions.
Moreover, whether or not migration is costly makes no diﬀerence to these conclusions: only
the size of the equalization transfers are aﬀected.
To summarize, with homogeneous labour, per capita levels of consumption and public
13 For region 1, the objective function when it cares about original residents is N1[u(c1)+
b(g1)] + (O1 − N1)[u(c2 + b(g2)] −
 O1−N1
0 k(x)dx. The same constraints apply.
11services and population will diﬀer across the two regions in the unitary state (or, planning)
optimum, and the migration equilibrium constraint will be binding. In the decentralized
federation when the regions are responsible for public good provision, the unitary state
optimum can be decentralized in a variety of ways. As long as the optimal equalization
scheme is in place which takes account of the net welfare eﬀects of migration, any of the
various taxes can be assigned to the regions. Regional governments will abide by the
eﬃciency conditions for public goods provision given they maximize the sum of utilities
regardless of their conjectures about migration responses. The VFI will be indeterminate.
That is, the central government can occupy whatever share of the tax room it chooses,
provided it transfers to each region an amount reﬂecting the sum of the tax revenues raised
in the region by the federal government and the region’s equalization entitlement.
We now turn to various extensions of the homogeneous labour case.
3 Extensions to the Homogeneous Labour Case
In this section, we retain the assumption of homogeneous labour and consider various
extensions to the above analysis. We begin by allowing the regions full ﬁscal responsibility
and show that although voluntary equalization transfers are feasible, they are generally
not suﬃcient to take the decentralized economy to the unitary state optimum. Next, we
examine the consequences of changing the order of decision-making among the various
players in the economy — the central government, the regional governments, and the
households. Unless the central government is the ﬁrst-mover, the unitary state optimum
cannot be decentralized.
Voluntary Inter-Regional Transfers
In the costless migration case, Myers (1990) has shown that there is no need for the
central government to impose equalization transfers as they will be made voluntarily from
one region to another. In the absence of migration costs, the utility possibility frontier
(UPF) consists of a single point since households will always achieve the same utility level.
Therefore, eﬃciency and equity coincide and voluntary transfers, which are eﬃcient in
this setting, will also be fully optimal. However, with migration costs, there is an equity-
eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Along the UPF, migration from region 1 to region 2 makes persons
in region 1 worse oﬀ and those infra-marginal in region 2 better oﬀ. Voluntary transfers
12may still reach a point on the national UPF in this case, as Mansoorian and Myers (1997)
show. More important for our purposes, they will not reach the socially optimal point.
We examine the role of equalization transfers here and illustrate that centrally imposed
transfers will be necessary to take the economy to the unitary state optimum, and will
fully crowd out voluntary transfers rendering the latter irrelevant.
To simplify our analysis, we assume, following Mansoorian and Myers (1993), that
there are no public goods. All rents accrue to the regions, so the source of potential
ineﬃciency is that in-migrants obtain a share of the rents in addition to their marginal
product, implying that they obtain their average product. Let T2 be a transfer from region
1 to region 2. It may be made by the central government or voluntarily by one of the
regions. Feasibility requires that c1 =( F1(N1)−T2)/N1 and c2 =( F2(N −N1)+T2)/(N −
N1), and, assuming migration from region 1 to 2, migration equilibrium requires u(c1)=
u(c2) − k(O1 − N1). Together with the feasibility conditions, this condition yields N1(T2)
where dN1/dT2 < 0.14 We can then deﬁne the aggregate utility of ﬁnal residents in regions
1a n d2a sV1(T2)a n dV2(T2), respectively.15 Consider then the central government’s
objective, which is W(T2) ≡V 1(T2)+V2(T2). The optimal transfer, say T∗






2 )=0 . 16
Suppose both regions agree that a transfer should be made by region 1, i.e., at T2 =0
V 
1(0) > 0a n dV 
2(0) > 0. Region 1 would optimally choose T2 such that V 
1(T2)=0 .N o w ,
at V 
1(T2)=0 ,W (T2)=V 
2(T2), which may be positive or negative. If it is positive, then
the central government would like to increase transfers. Doing this crowds out regional
transfers on a one-for-one basis. The central government increases the transfers until
W (T∗
2) = 0 and therefore, V 
1(T∗
2) < 0a n dV 
2(T∗
2 ) > 0, implying that voluntary transfers
would not suﬃce to achieve the unitary state optimum. If instead it is negative, then the
level of voluntary transfers that region 1 wants to make will not be accepted by region
2. Region 2 will only accept transfers until V 
2(T2) = 0, while at this point, W (T2)=
14 Diﬀerentiating, dN1/dT2 = −[u (c1)(R1 − T2)/N1 + u (c2)(R2 + T2)/N2 + k ]−1 [u (c1)/N1
+ u (c2)/N 2 ] < 0.
15 To be precise, V1(T2) ≡ N1(T2)u([F1(N1(T2)) − T2]/N1(T2)) and V2(T2) ≡(N − N1(T2))u(
[ F2(N − N1(T2)) +T2]/ (N − N1(T2))) −
 O1−N1(T2)
0 k(x)dx.
16 It is assumed that the second-order condition of the central government’s problem is satisﬁed.
13V 
1(T2) > 0 and a conundrum arises. Both the central and region 1 governments would like
to increase transfers, but region 2 will not accept them! Unless region 2 can be forced to
accept the central government’s transfers, the only way for the unitary state outcome to
be achieved is for the central government to rely solely on the interpersonal tax-transfer
system and set t1 > 0a n dt2 < 0 such that t1N1 = −t2N2 = T∗
2 .
Suppose instead that the two regions are in disagreement about the direction of the
transfer. There are two possible cases. First, at T2 =0 ,i tm a yb et h a tV 
1(0) > 0a n d
V 
2(0) < 0, so region 1 would like to make transfers, but region 2 will not accept any.
No transfers are possible, and presumably this is can also be a problem for the central
government. Again, the central government would have to implement the transfer via the
interpersonal redistribution system. Second, it could be that at T2 =0 ,V 
1(0) < 0a n d
V 
2(0) > 0. In this case, region 2 would like to receive transfers, but region 1 is not willing
to make them. While the central government may not be able to force region 1 to make
a transfer, it could achieve the equivalent outcome by using its power to tax, and make a
transfer to region 2, which would be willingly accepted.
We can conclude that if the central government adopts a policy that implements the
unitary state optimum, then any voluntary transfers will be completely crowded out. Of
course, the above discussion is only suggestive since we have not analyzed the circumstances
in which the various options would occur. Further work is needed to characterize fully the
relationship between the allocations under voluntary transfers with those of the unitary
state optimum. Nonetheless, it is clear that the scope for voluntary transfers is drastically
limited when the UPF does not consist of a single point.
Diﬀerent Timing I: Migration First
It might be argued that since migration is a relatively long-term decision, it may take
place before policies are enacted. Equivalently, governments may not be able to commit
to future ﬁscal policies. Mitsui and Sato (2001) have analyzed this problem for the case
of costless mobility. Following their analysis, we reverse the order of decision-making so
that migrants move in Stage 1 anticipating government policy, and in the second stage,
the unitary state government chooses its policies, taking labour allocation across regions
as given. We again use backward induction.
14The problem of the unitary state government is identical to problem (P) in Section
2 without the migration equilibrium condition (γ). Taking labour allocations as prede-
termined the unitary state government no longer selects N1 as an artiﬁcal variable and
therefore, is not constrained by the migration equilibrium. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
identical to those in problem (P) except with γ = 0. Therefore, the conditions on ti and
gi imply that the standard public good eﬃciency conditions (1) are satisﬁed, c1 = c2 and,
for α<1, g1> <g2 as N1> <N2.
Households anticipate that consumption will be equalized across regions, c1 = c2.
Therefore, they have an incentive to migrate to the region with the highest public good
provision, which will be the most populous one. In the special case where there are
no migration costs, all households will move to a single region (the Mitsui-Sato result).
If migration is costly, not all households will necessarily locate in one region. Given
that c1 = c2, the migration equilibrium condition for an interior solution will be b(g1)=
b(g2)+k(O1 − N1). Obviously, the unitary state optimum as described in Section 2
cannot be achieved when migration occurs before government policy, and likewise in the
decentralized case. However, if the interregional equalization transfers Ti takes place ﬁrst,
followed by migration and the choice of regional tax and expenditure policies, then the
problem is overcome. Hence, what is critical for decentralizing the unitary state optimum
from Section 2 is that the central government move ﬁrst.
Diﬀerent Timing II: Regions Move before Central Government
Suppose that regions choose gi before central policies are chosen. This might be reasonable
if one supposes that actual expenditure decisions are of a longer-term nature than tax
and transfer decisions. We revert to the assumption that migration occurs after policies
are implemented. It is straightforward to see that the unitary state optimum cannot be
decentralized regardless of how public expenditures are ﬁnanced. To see this, consider
the simplest case in which all ﬁnancing is done by central taxes, and funds are simply
transferred to the regions to cover the costs of the public goods. This is the extreme case
of a soft budget constraint.
Since regions move ﬁrst anticipating the induced central government behaviour, it is
necessary to ﬁrst consider the central government’s problem. It can be characterized using
problem (P) from Section 2 and treating g1 and g2, which are chosen by the regions, as
15given. As well, we ignore all the possible regional taxes considered in the previous section
and assume only central taxes are imposed. From this problem we can obtain the ﬁrst
order conditions which together with the constraints determine the optimal values for the
choice variables {t1,t 2,T 1,T 2,N 1} in terms of the exogenous variables {g1,g 2}. As before,
the ﬁrst-order conditions on central taxes and transfers ensure the marginal cost of public
funds are equalized across regions. Likewise, we obtain an interpretation of the nationwide























 (O1 − N1)( 5 )
which is analogous to (3) and determines the optimal allocation of population. Thus, fed-
eral behaviour is characterized by the choice of {t1,t 2,T 1,T 2,N 1} that satisﬁes conditions
(2) and (5) and its constraints, for given values of {g1,g 2}. It is this characterization that
the regional governments anticipate.
Consider now the optimizing behaviour of region 1. Assuming it behaves as a Nash
competitor with respect to the other region, it chooses g1,g i v e ng2 and anticipating central
government behaviour. The regions can choose the central government policy variables
artiﬁcially by incorporating the equations governing central behaviour into their problem.
Therefore, region 1’s problem is as follows, where we have eliminated the central-regional





N1t1 +( N − N1)t2 + R1(N1)+R2(N − N1) − Nα
1 g1 − (N − N1)αg2 ≥ 0( λ1)
u(c2)+b(g2) − k(O1 − N1) − u(c1) − b(g1)=0 ( γ1)
t1 − αN
α−1













 (O1 − N1)=0 ( δ)
where ci = F 







λ1 + δ(N − N1N2u  (c1)k (O1 − N1)/u (c1)2)
(6)
16In general, the migration equilibrium constraint will be binding (δ  =0 )a n dt h er i g h t - h a n d
side of (6) will not be unity. Therefore, the eﬃciency conditions for public goods (1) will
not be satisﬁed, and since the sign of δ is ambiguous, there can be over- or under-supply.
In any case, the unitary state optimum cannot be decentralized when regions move before
the central government.
4 Heterogeneous Labour
In this section, households are assumed to diﬀer in their labour productivity. This intro-
duces the possibility of intra-regional as well as inter-regional redistribution. Unlike with
homogenous labour, the case of costless migration has qualitatively diﬀerent results from
the costly case and therefore, we treat each of the two cases in turn.
Costless Migration
Households are assumed to be of two types — high-ability types denoted by h and low-
ability types denoted by  . They supply respectively ah and a  eﬃciency units of labour
each, where ah >a   and are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. The produc-
tion function in region i is Fi(Ai), where Ai = ahNh
i + a N 
i is the total eﬀective labour
supply in region i. As before, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labour is equal to the
marginal product F  




i (Ai). With competitive labour markets, type-h workers receive a
labour income of ahF 
i(Ai), and type-  workers receive a F 
i(Ai). We again assume that
region 2 is the more productive one: F2(A) >F 1(A),F  
2(A) >F 
1(A).
Household utility is now u(c
j
i)+b(gi)f o rj = h,  and i =1 ,2. Migration equilibrium





2)+b(g2) j = h, 
With costless migration, the initial allocation of labour is irrelevant. Only the total pop-
ulations matter.
Unitary State Optimum
Following the method of the previous section, we characterize the optimum of a ﬁcti-
tious unitary state government. We maintain separate budgets for the central government
17and the regions purely for expositional purposes. Assume for simplicity that taxes are
notionally levied at the central level, with the VFI being made up by transfers to the
regions Ti. Taxes are lump-sum and imposed on each type of households in each region,
t
j
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2 − T1 − T2 =0 ( λ)
Ti + Ri(Ai) − (Nh
i + N 















− b(g1)=0 j = h,  (γj)
The ﬁrst-order conditions on gi and t
j
i yield the analogue of the eﬃciency conditions
































=1 ( 7 )
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem, assuming it is interior,
is one in which the migration equilibrium conditions are not binding. To see this, suppose








2 = c 
2 = c. Subtracting the condition on Nh
1 from N 
1,w eo b t a i n
that F  
1(A1)=F 
2(A2), which then implies from these conditions that N
α−1
1 g1 = N
α−1
2 g2,
or, using the condition on gi, g1b (g1)=g2b (g2).17 This will be solved by g1 = g2,w h i c h
in turn implies that N1 = N2.18 Note also that since we have assumed region 2 to be
t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v e ,A2 >A 1. Thus, although the total populations are identical in the
two regions, region 2 must have a higher proportion of type-h residents. Finally, note that
17 The ﬁrst order conditions on gi (i =1 ,2) and N
j




i =0a n daj 
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18 This may not be a unique solution, depending on the form of the function b(g). In what
follows, we assume it to be unique.
18this symmetric solution satisﬁes the migration equilibrium conditions (γh), (γ ), so full
consumption equality holds in the unitary state optimum.
This solution is very diﬀerent from the homogeneous labour case, where an asymmetric
equilibrium is the norm (N1  = N2, c1  = c2, g1  = g2). It is apparent that this result can be
generalized to many regions and many types. The migration equilibrium constraint will
not be binding whenever the number of ability-types is at least as great as the number
of regions. In our setting of full information and lump-sum taxes, this implies that all
households will enjoy the same levels of consumption and public services. Of course, as with
the two-region case of this section, this requires that the assumptions of our model apply.
In particular, diﬀerent ability-types of labour must be perfect substitutes in production.
Although the unitary state optimum has full consumption equality and common levels
of public services in the two regions, equalization payments between regions will generally
be required. Since G1 = G2 in the unitary state optimum, combining the two regional
budget constraint yields:
T1 − T2 = R2(A2) − R1(A1) > 0
which follows from A2 >A 1 and implies that an equalization transfer is made from the
more to the less productive region. This result that transfers should equalize for the
diﬀerence in rents in the high- and low-productivity regions follows from the fact that we
have allocated rents to the regional budgets. If all rents went to the central government,
the transfer to the two regions would be the same since it is the sole source of ﬁnance of
public goods expenditure.
The results of this section depend on the solution being an interior one for both types
of labour. If the populations of the two types of labour do not allow for an interior solution,
then the outcome will be quite diﬀerent. One of the regions will generally have only one
type of labour. In the region with a heterogeneous population, there will be full equality
of consumption between types. However, between regions, populations will generally diﬀer
and so too will the level of public services and consumption. The nature of this solution
will be as in the homogeneous case.
Decentralizing the Unitary State Optimum
The regional governments have control over the spending Gi in their regions. The issue is
19what ﬁnancing instruments can be given to the regions so that the unitary state optimum
can be replicated. The unitary state optimum requires that a) consumption be equalized
for all households, b) the eﬃciency conditions for public goods be satisﬁed in each region,
and c) populations be equalized across the two regions so that the actual level of public
services is the same. It is straightforward to show that if the regions have access to either
a surtax on central government taxes or a payroll tax, decentralization cannot achieve the
unitary state optimum. However, the other two regional tax instruments can be used to
decentralize the unitary state optimum — the consumption tax or a diﬀerentiated lump-
sum tax on households.19
To see this, consider the problem of, say, regional government 1 when it has access to
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i =[ ( 1− π1)ajF 




1]/(1 + θi). Rents are assumed to accrue
to the regions, but this is inessential since the central government can undo the eﬀect of
diﬀerential rents in the two regions using its transfers Ti.
The solution to this problem depends on what region 1 assumes about the Nash be-
haviour of region 2, that is, what is assumed to determine the other region’s policies. Since
we cannot say that in advance, our results throughout this section must apply whatever
the conjecture region 1 makes (and, of course, vice versa for region 2). It suﬃces to con-
sider the ﬁrst-order conditions on the relevant tax instruments and the amount of public
19 A uniform poll tax would also be suﬃcient, but that is a special case of household-speciﬁc
lump-sum taxes. The central government can always choose its policies such that the regions
choose to impose uniform lump-sum taxes on their residents.
20good g1. The ﬁrst-order condition on g1 is the same regardless of the tax instrument(s)
available to the regional government and is given by:
(Nh
1 − γh
1 + N 
1 − γ 
1)b (g1) − λ1Nα
1 =0 ( g1)
First, consider the case when the regional government has access to either a surtax





1) − (N 






















where the values of the Lagrange multipliers depend not only on central government poli-
cies, but also on what the regions perceive to be the migration responses as a result of
their policies. It is clear that, even if consumption levels within a region are equalized
as in the unitary state, the eﬃciency conditions for public good provision (7) cannot be
obtained from condition (g1) under either tax. This follows from the facts that ah >a  
and to achieve equal consumption the central government must set th
1  = t 
1.S i n c e t h e
unitary state optimum requires that the eﬃciency conditions for public goods be satisﬁed,
regional ﬁnancing by a surtax or a payroll tax will not suﬃce, unlike in the homogeneous
labour case.
Next, consider the case where the regional government has access only to a consump-
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1 + c 
1N 
1)=0 ( θ1)
The central government can select personal tax rates within each region such that con-
sumption is equalized between high-and low-productivity types. In that case, the above
ﬁrst-order condition together with (g1) will reduce to the eﬃciency conditions for public
goods (7). Then, the central government can equalize consumption levels between regions
and ensure that the regions provide equal levels of public services by an appropriate choice
of equalization transfers. Thus, the unitary state optimum will be achieved. Moreover, the
VFI will be indeterminate since the central government can perfectly substitute per capita
21tax rates and transfers to the regions.20 Moreover, this will be true whatever conjecture
regions make about migration responses.
A similar result applies if the regions are allowed to use redistributive taxes on indi-
viduals, τ
j
i . In this case, the regions decide not only how much it should spend on public
services, but also how much tax to raise from each type of person. The central government












1 =0 j = h,  (τ
j
1)
In this case, the eﬃciency condition for the public good (7) is obtained directly by com-
bining the three ﬁrst-order conditions (τ 
1), (τh
1 )a n d( g1). Central government policy must
then induce each region to set their tax rates {τh
i ,τ 
i } optimally, that is, so that consump-
tion is equalized across types within the region. This will only apply if the migration
equilibrium constraints are not binding (γ
j
i = 0). Obviously, that will be the case if the
regions are myopic with respect to migration. In the case of non-myopic behaviour on
the part of regional governments, the central government must ensure that each region
has the resources such that when it optimizes, the migration equilibrium constraints are
not binding. The optimal equalization scheme of the unitary state optimum will suﬃce to
ensure that.
When the optimum is decentralized by allowing the regions to use redistributive taxes
τ
j
i , central government policies are indeterminate in two dimensions. First, the size of
the VFI is indeterminate: what is important for ensuring that the migration equilibrium
constraints will not be binding is that the relative amounts of resources available in the two
regions be optimal. Second, central government intra-regional redistribution policies will
be irrelevant. Regional redistribution policies are perfect substitutes for central policies,
and regions move after the central government. Thus, the regions can be made solely
responsible for redistributive policies.
To summarize, the unitary state optimum with costless migration will equalize con-
sumption and public services for households across types and regions. Population will be
20 We are assuming that migration responses are stable and converge to the unitary state
optimum.
22equalized between regions, and the migration equilibrium constraints for the two types will
not be binding. There will be an equalization transfer from region 2 to region 1 to the
extent that regions have access to rents. The unitary state optimum can be decentralized
by allowing the regions to ﬁnance their public goods using either a general consumption
tax or redistributive taxes on the two types of households, and instituting the optimal
equalization transfer. When regional consumption taxes are used, the central government
retains control of redistribution, while if the regions can use redistributive taxes, central
government redistribution policy becomes irrelevant. In either case, the VFI is indetermi-
nate.
Costly Migration
Now suppose that there are diﬀerent non-decreasing migration costs. Since there are two
types of migrants, we can let them have the following migration cost functions: kh(Oh
1−Nh
1 )






1 for j = h,  are the numbers of migrants of each type. We
continue to assume that migration of both types goes from region 1 to region 2. The issue
now is whether full intra-regional equality of consumption will still apply. We begin by
showing that in general the migration equilibrium constraints will be binding in the unitary
state optimum. This implies that γh,γ   = 0, although in general they can take either sign.
Then, we investigate the consequences of this for the pattern of consumption and resource
allocation in the unitary state. Finally, we consider the possibility of decentralizing the
unitary state allocation when the regions have responsibility for providing the public good.
To see that the migration equilibrium constraints will be binding when migration is
costly, we investigate the problem of the unitary state government when these constraints
are not imposed. Following the same procedure as in the costless migration case, assume
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Ti + Ri(Ai) − (Nh
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2. Finally, the ﬁrst-order conditions on N
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The ﬁrst three terms represent the utility diﬀerential between region 1 and region 2 for the




2), which will be zero if the two migration equilibrium conditions
are satisﬁed. Thus, the migration equilibrium conditions will be satisﬁed — and therefore






2 )=0f o rj = h, .
These will generally not be satisﬁed in the presence of migration costs.21 The exception is
the special case where migration costs are constant (kj  = 0) and the public good is pure
(α =0 ) . 22
The next step will be to characterize the allocation of consumption and public services
in the unitary state optimum given that the migration equilibrium constraints are binding.
We show that in an interior solution (when both types of persons are present in both
regions), consumption will generally not be equalized either within or between regions.
This is in contrast to the case of costless migration.
Unitary State Optimum
21 Subtracting (N 
1)f r o m( Nh
1 ), we obtain: kh(Oh
1 −Nh
1 )−k (O 
1 −N 
1)+λ(ah −a )(F 
1(A1)−
F 
2(A2)) = 0. Therefore, if kh(Oh
1 − Nh
1 ) > (<)k (O 
1 − N 
1)t h e nF 




1)c o u l de q u a lk (O 
1−N 
1), but in general we can neglect that possibility.)
From (g1)a n d( g2), there are only two possible outcomes, g1 >g 2 and N1 >N 2 or g1 <g 2
and N1 <N 2. In either case, the migration equilibrium constraints will not be satisﬁed.
22 Subtracting (N 
1)f r o m( Nh
1 ), we obtain: (ah − a )(F 
1(A1) − F 
2(A2)) = 0 Therefore, since
ah >a  , F 
1(A1)=F 
2(A2), which implies from (Nh
1 )a n d( N 
1)t h a tb(g1) − b(g2)+k =0
and the migration equilibrium conditions will be satisﬁed for both types of households. Note
that this result depends on the fact that migration is going in the same direction for both
types. If they move in opposite directions, migration equilibrium cannot be satisﬁed for both
at the same time. Therefore, we must have either a corner solution, or one in which both
types move in the same direction.
24As shown above, the migration equilibrium conditions will generally be binding with costly
migration. Therefore, the problem of our ﬁctitious unitary state government is the same
as the one given above except with the two migration equilibrium conditions as additional
constraints. Assuming that migration goes from region 1 to region 2 for both types of



















1)=0 j = h,  (γj)
Solving this problem, it is straightforward to show that, in general, the solution will be
asymmetric — c
j
i diﬀers between both household types and regions, and gi, F 
i(Ai)a n dNi
diﬀer between regions. This is demonstrated in the Appendix.
Combining the ﬁrst-order conditions on t
j
i, we obtain conditions governing inter-region
and intra-region redistribution, the analogue to (2) for the homogeneous case (where the
































Then, substituting the conditions on t
j
i into the conditions for the gi’s, we obtain the
standard public goods eﬃciency conditions given by (7). The optimal distribution of






















1) j = h,  (9)
where, as mentioned, γj> <0. These conditions have similar interpretations as before. Migra-
tion will occur until the diﬀerence in NFE is just equal to the social value of the increment
in resources required to keep the migration equilibrium constraint in balance.
The unitary state government can implement this optimum by its choice of policy
instruments {t
j
i,g i,T i}. From the regional budget constraints, the diﬀerence in per capita


















This accounting identity states that the equalization transfer compensates for diﬀerences in
tax capacity, per capita rents, and expenditure needs. The equalization scheme combined
25with the other ﬁscal policies must ensure that the optimal population allocation conditions
(N
j
1) are satisﬁed. These conditions for the two types of persons imply that
t 














Moreover, using the migration optimality conditions, an explicit expression for the equal-







































j = h,  (10)
where ¯ ti is average per capita tax revenues raised in region i.
Decentralizing the Unitary State Optimum
The unitary state optimum requires that within each region both the optimal amount of
redistribution between high- and low-ability persons and the optimal output of the regional
public good be achieved. These requirements are challenging for designing the ﬁnancial
arrangements that must accompany decentralization. It is straightforward to show that,
whatever conjecture the region adopts about the eﬀect of its policies on migration, the
regional governments must have the ability to redistribute between high and low-ability
types within their jurisdictions. This is necessary in order that the eﬃciency conditions for
public goods (7) be satisﬁed. We begin by establishing that. Then, we turn to the issue
of how to ensure that the regions will use their redistributive instruments to achieve the
optimal amount of redistribution within their respective jurisdictions. It turns out that a
simple equalization transfer will not suﬃce. An incentive must be introduced to inﬂuence
the way in which the regions use their redistributive responsibilities.
To see that the regional governments must be given redistributive responsibilities,
we follow the same procedure as in the costless migration case and set up the regional
government’s problem with all four possible tax instruments – a surcharge on central taxes
σi, a consumption tax θi, a payroll tax πi, and diﬀerentiated lump-sum taxes on households
τ
j
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First, suppose the regional government has access to all the taxes except the lump-sum
tax on households. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ﬁscal variables are:
(Nh
1 − γh
1 + N 
1 − γ 
1)b (g1) − λNα
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None of the above ﬁrst-order conditions on the three tax instruments (σ1), (θ1), and (π1)
will ensure that condition (g1) reduces to the eﬃciency condition for public goods provision





1  =0 ) .
Suppose then that the regional governments are able to levy redistributive taxes
{τh
i ,τ 









1 =0 j = h,  (τ
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1)
where the levels of consumption c
j
1 reﬂect the fact that the central government may also
levy redistributive taxes t
j
i. Similar conditions apply for region 2 although the problem
of the government is slightly diﬀerent since it must account for the migration costs of the
persons who migrate into the region. Combining the conditions (τ 
1), (τh
1 ), and (g1)w e
obtain the public goods eﬃciency conditions (7) conﬁrming that in the heterogeneous case
with costly migration, the regions must be given the authority to redistribute income.
There are a number of features of regional behaviour that are worth noting. First, the
above results will apply regardless of the conjecture that regions make about migration
27responses. Second, the VFI is indeterminate for the same reason as in earlier problems. A
decrease in t
j
1 accompanied by a compensating decrease in central transfers will not aﬀect
the solution to the regional problem. The regional government will fully oﬀset the decline
in central taxes by increasing their own rates. Third, as the above problem is stated,
redistribution will be decided entirely by the regions. Any revenue-neutral attempt by the
central government to change inter-personal redistribution by adjusting the relative tax
rates th
1 and t 
1 will be completely oﬀset by the regions. This is a consequence of the regions
being second movers. In fact, this inability of the central government to inﬂuence the
distribution of consumption within a region turns out to pose a diﬃculty in decentralizing
the unitary state optimum, as we shall now see.
Consider the problems of the two regions. To be concrete, assume that each region
behaves as a Nash competitor with respect to the policies of the other region as well as the
central government.23 As just discussed, central government taxes are redundant in this
decentralized setting in the sense that their use does not add anything to the ability of the
central government to control regional government behavior. Therefore, we can suppress
them from the following analysis and assume that the only central government policy
instruments are transfers to the regions T1 and T2. The problem of region 1 is as above and





as well as the Lagrangian multipliers {λ1,γh
1,γ 
1} as functions of the central government
policies and those of region 2 {T1,τh
2 ,τ 
2,g 2}. Likewise, we can solve for a similar problem
for region 2 taking into account the migration costs borne by some of its ﬁnal residents.










In a Nash equilibrium, the solutions to these two sets of equations must be simultane-
ously satisﬁed, and the values of N
j
1 desired by both regions must be compatible. A Nash















i} for the two regions that solve the two sets of ﬁrst-order
23 This implies that the regions do not take into account that budget constraints of other
governments. An alternative approach would be to assume that one policy variable of the
other government is determined by budget balance. The choice of endogenous variable aﬀects
the Nash equilibrium outcome (Wildasin 1988). Adopting this alternative modeling strategy
will not aﬀect our results.
28conditions, given central policies {T1,T 2}. Given these policies, the allocation of resources










It can be seen that the central government does not have enough instruments to ensure
that the regions choose both the optimal allocation of resources between public goods and
private goods and the distribution of consumption goods between the two ability-types.
Both these need to be satisﬁed if labour is to be allocated optimally between the two
regions. In the homogeneous labour case, the region’s only discretion was with respect to
the allocation of regional income between public and private sectors. This was assured by
the fact that the regions abided by the eﬃciency rule for public goods provision. Then,
inter-regional transfers were suﬃcient to ensure that regional incomes were such that the
levels of consumption and public goods were optimal in the two regions. Given that,
population allocation would be optimal. In this case, the regions will optimally choose the
division of output between private goods and public goods, provided they are given the
power to redistribute. However, it is not suﬃcient to use equalization transfers to achieve
the correct distribution of incomes between the two regions. The regions will generally not
choose the optimal distribution of private goods between the two type of households.






i ) in the Nash equilibrium must correspond with those that solve the corresponding
ﬁrst-order conditions in the central government’s problem, (t
j
i). That, in turn, requires
that the relative values of the Lagrange multipliers in the central and regional problems
be aligned in a particular way, and that cannot be achieved with the available central
government instruments. Intuitively, the use of {T1,T 2} can change the relative values
of the shadow value of public funds in the two regions, {λ1,λ 2}, but it cannot be used
to manipulate the relative values of {γh
i ,γ 
i} within region i, which is what determines
t h er e l a t i v ev a l u e so f{ch
i ,c  
i}, that is, intra-regional redistribution. As can be seen, the
two regional problems are substantially diﬀerent from one another and from the problem
of the unitary state, and the relative values of {γ
j
i} can take arbitrarily diﬀerent values
depending on the structure of preferences and production functions in the economy.
In order to decentralize the unitary state optimum, the central government must have
policy instruments that enable it to inﬂuence the incentives of the regions to redistribute,
that is to aﬀect the relative values of {γh
i ,γ 
i} within each region. As we have noted,
29redistributive personal taxes will not work because they will be undone by regional re-
distribution policies. Instead, policies must be able to work independently on the two
migration equilibrium constraints facing regional governments, since it is those that deter-
mine the multipliers {γ
j
i}. Moreover, the policies must be diﬀerentiated by region.24 Such
a policy would be to reﬁne the system of equalization transfers so that they are contingent
on the numbers of each type of person in the region.
Let T
j
i be the transfer to region i per type-j person in the region. Then, region i’s
total transfer is Th
i Nh
i + T 
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The ﬁrst-order conditions on (g1)a n d( τ
j
1) are as before and the ﬁrst-order conditions on
N
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1 and T 
1 enter separately in the above two ﬁrst-order conditions, it is clear that they
can be used to aﬀect the tightness of the migration constraints and therefore the relative
sizes of their multipliers, {γh
1,γ 
1}. This provides the central government the needed degrees
of freedom in each region to induce the regions to divide their aggregate consumption
between ch
i and c 
i optimally.
We can now summarize the results for the heterogeneous labour case. The unitary
state optimum diﬀers in this case depending on whether or not migration is costly. When
there is costless migration and an interior solution for both types of migrants, then the
24 Thus, diﬀerential migration subsidies on the two types of persons would not suﬃce because
they do not aﬀect the migration constraints diﬀerentially in the two regions.
30migration equilibrium constraints are not binding. As a result, per capita levels of con-
sumption and the level of public services will be equalized across and within regions. As
well, population will be the same in both regions, but the more productive one will have a
higher proportion of high-ability persons. It turns out that the set of instruments that can
be used to decentralize the unitary state optimum is strictly smaller than in the homoge-
neous labour case. Allowing regions to use either a surtax on central government taxes or a
payroll tax will not result in the unitary state optimum whereas allowing them to use either
a consumption tax or diﬀerential lump-sum taxes on households will. In the latter case,
the central government through its choice of personal tax rates and equalization transfers
or simply equalization transfers can ensure that the unitary state optimum is achieved.
These results are in sharp contrast to those obtained when migration is costly. In this
case, the migration constraints will necessarily be binding in the unitary state optimum.
As a result, per capita levels of consumptions will generally diﬀer both across and within
regions when there are both types of workers in each region. As well, the level of public
services will generally be diﬀerent in the two regions. To decentralize the unitary state
optimum, regional governments must have the ability to redistribute between the diﬀer-
ent types of workers in their respective region. This will ensure that the standard public
good eﬃciency conditions are satisﬁed. The central government must then intervene and
introduce some incentive to ensure that the regional governments undertake the optimal
amount of redistribution within their jurisdictions. In other words, a standard equaliza-
tion system is not suﬃcient to decentralize the unitary state optimum. The equalization
transfers must be made contingent on the numbers of each type of persons in the region
in order to achieve the unitary state optimum.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The possible extensions to the general framework developed in this paper have by no means
been exhausted. We conclude by discussing some of them. In the homogeneous labour
case, several extensions could be considered some of which have already appeared in the
literature. For example, we could assume that migration costs are prohibitive. This is the
extreme case of no mobility. We could also have allowed for central-regional bargaining over
inter-regional transfers as in Sato (1998). Allowing for tax exporting by having a source-
based tax on rent owned both by residents and non-residents would be another interesting
31extension. A national public good with voluntary contributions by the region as in Cornes
and Silva (2000) or Ihori (2001) could also be introduced. A more novel extension would
be to explore the implications of having idiosyncratic regional shocks. There are also
several extensions which have received less attention in the literature. For example, it
was assumed in the heterogeneous labour case that labour is perfectly substitutable in the
production function. Perhaps a more reasonable assumption would be to treat high and
low ability workers as two diﬀerent inputs in the production process. It seems likely that
the symmetric outcome in the case of costless migration would no longer be obtained. We
could also have allowed for some aversion to inequality. Finally, involuntary unemployment
resulting from either frictions in the labour market, eﬃciency wages, or union-bargaining
could be incorporated into the model.
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35Appendix
We show that, when migration costs are increasing for each ability-type and migration
goes from region 1 to region 2, consumption will diﬀer across households, and populations,
marginal products and public services will diﬀer across regions.
Suppose we eliminate the Lagrange multipliers from the ﬁrst-order conditions for
the unitary state optimum problem. The four equations (t
j
1) can be reduced to one by











































































































We also have the public goods eﬃciency conditions which are given by (7). Finally, using
the expressions for γh/λ and γ /λ,( Nh
1 )a n d( N 
1) become:
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This leaves us with 8 equations — (c),(7),(Nh
1 ),(N 
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2 = c2. We show that this incompatible with






















36There are two options. Either c1 = c2 = C,o rNh
1 /N  
1 = Nh/N  . Consider these in turn.
Case 1: c1 = c2 = c
Then, (γh), (γ ), (Nh
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These two equations determine Nh
1 and N 
1, and therefore, N1, N2, A1 and A2.G i v e nt h e














2 b (g2)( g)
F1(A1)+F2(A2) − NC− Nα
1 g1 − Nα
2 g2 =0 ( λ)
Therefore, the system is underdetermined: we do not have enough variables left to solve
these equations. This implies that consumption cannot generally be equalized within and
across regions when migration is costly.
Case 2: Nh
1 /N  
1 = Nh/N  




1 − N 
1)
This combined with Nh
1 /N  
1 = Nh/N   determines Nh
1 and N 
1, and therefore A1 and A2.
We are left with (g1), (g2), (Nh
1 ), (N 
1), (λ) and:
u(c2)+b(g2) − u(c1) − b(g1)=kH(·)=kL(·)( γ)
We only have four variables left to determine: c1,c 2,g 1,g 2. The system is again underde-
termined.
The upshot is that consumption cannot generally be equalized within regions when
migration costs are increasing.
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